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Introduction 
 
Oman-United Arab Emirates border, Thursday 5 May 2016 early morning. As it has been the 
case for years on long weekends and holidays, endless queues of cars from Oman are waiting to 
cross the border in order to flock to Dubai for Isra’ and Miraj break1 and enjoy attractions and 
entertainment that their country does not seem to offer. Major traffic congestions are taking 
place in the Omani city of al-Buraymi separated from the contiguous United Arab Emirates city 
of al-Ayn by the international border. 
 Many border cities are contiguous urban areas which have been ‘dependent on the 
border for [their] existence’ or even ‘came into existence because of the border’.
2
 Usually once 
military outposts (Eilat/Aqaba, on the Israel-Jordan border3), they developed on either side of a 
long established border (Niagara Falls cities, on the Canada-USA border) after a border had 
been drawn (Tornio, on the Sweden-Finland border;4 cities on the Mexico-USA and China-
Russia
5
 borders). Furthermore, split-up cities which were partitioned after World War II, 
including in Central Europe (e.g. on the Germany-Poland border6), experienced some transfer of 
original population and relocation of a totally different one on an ethno-cultural basis due to 
the drawing of new borders.7 
None of these applies to the case of al-Ayn/al-Buraymi, where the urban settlement 
long predates the border. These two cities existed as a unique oasis (known as al-Buraymi) 
comprised of nine small villages until the late 1950s, when agreements for the reciprocal 
recognition of territorial jurisdiction were signed by the Sultan of Oman and the Emir of Abu 
Dhabi, at the initiative of the British. Six villages, including Ayn al-Dhawahir (later known as al-
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Ayn) were deemed to pay tribute to the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the remaining three, including 
al-Buraymi itself, historically the oasis’ largest village, were recognised loyal to Oman. When the 
sultanate of Oman and the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became independent 
from the British (in 1970 and 1971 respectively), this political division of the oasis was 
confirmed, but without physical borderline and border control materialising it other than on the 
maps until the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Individuals were used to cross regularly the border 
from one country to another, the two towns effectively working like one unit. It is in 2002 only 
that the UAE started to install a fence along its border with Oman, including in the al-Ayn/al-
Buraymi conurbation. 
The political and economic trajectories of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi, whose populations 
reached 519,000 and 104,000 respectively in 2016 (see table 1), have been adversarial, 
epitomising the evolution of the relationship between the two countries. The common past and 
the ‘notion of being one community with common interests and belonging together’8 have 
been present among inhabitants of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi since the independence, with the 
maintenance of close contacts (through family and marriage relations, and business activities) 
across the border. However the top-down political priorities of both national leaderships in the 
UAE and Oman have contributed to substantially re-define the perception of the border in 
these cities and the local populations’ life and actions. In particular, the drawing of an 
international demarcation across the oasis has led to the sprouting of new dynamics resulting 
from the increasing divergence of trajectories of social and economic development. Because of 
these conflicting evolutions and the absence of like-mindedness and of ‘intention to construct 
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and maintain the common space or to reach common goals’,9 al-Ayn and al-Buraymi cannot be 
regarded as a ‘binational city’ or even as ‘twin cities’.
10
 
While most studies on this oasis have concentrated on the pre-independence era, and in 
particular on the dispute over its control during the 1950s,
11
 this paper chooses to focus instead 
on its evolution since the early 1970s. The study of these two border cities, sharing history but 
growing apart since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, provides a window onto unfolding 
patterns of the construction of political sovereignty and legitimacy in post-colonial states and 
the link between the building of national identity and the physical demarcation from the 
(br)other. Since the early 1970s and the accession of Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the 
independence, the building of both a state apparatus and a nation has lain at the heart of the 
political projects of the two rulers to assert their political legitimacy and control over their 
respective territory. This issue of the mutual relationship with the neighbour has been 
particularly crucial, given the tribal and ethnic proximity between inhabitants living across the 
new international boundary but also the two countries’ shared modern history. 
The paper, which is structured into two parts, shows that the opposed trajectories 
followed by the border cities of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi after the independence emulate the way 
how the United Arab Emirates and Oman have grown separately. The first part of the paper will 
highlight the slow process of mutual recognition between the two newly independent countries 
from the 1970s to the beginning of the 2000s. While comparable state-building projects were 
implemented simultaneously in Abu Dhabi and Muscat, the trajectories of al-Ayn and al-
Buraymi started diverging significantly due to the contrasting role central authorities gave to 
these cities in respective state-building projects. This paper then shows in a second part that 
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the question of the separation from the (br)other re-emerged at the beginning of the 2000s 
while both countries had to face domestic challenges calling into question the socio-political 
order established in the 1970s. This had a direct impact on the management of the border, 
since growing suspicions and mistrust in both capitals resulted in al-Ayn and al-Buraymi 
increasingly turning their back to each other. These processes have been accompanied by 
renewed questioning related to respective national identities, especially when dealing with the 
relation to the brother across the border. 
 
 Twin post-independence nation-building projects but opposite 
management of the borderlands 
 
Former President of the federation of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan 
(r.1971-2004) and Sultan Qaboos of Oman (r.1970-…) accessed power in similar circumstances. 
They both overthrew the incumbent ruler – Zayed’s brother and Qaboos’s father – with the 
help of British advisers. Their respective room to maneuver with regard to the British were 
reduced to a minimum, as a result of the imperial policy that had been developed since the 
mid-19
th
 century. The Gulf had become a place ‘where time had stood still […] frozen into the 
requirements of the pax Britannica’
12
 and where political actors were isolated from the outside 
world and tributary to Britain alone. However this had started changing in the late 1950s, at the 
heyday of Arab nationalism, and the southern shore of the Gulf was not cut off from political 
convulsions anymore. In particular, the Dhofar region, in Southern Oman, was the theatre from 
the 1960s of an uprising against the authority of then Sultan of Oman Said bin Taymur (r. 1932-
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70). Gradually, this movement morphed into the Marxist–Leninist Popular Front for the 
Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). In July 1970, when the uprising was about to 
spread to northern Oman, the British orchestrated the Sultan of Oman’s overthrow by his son 
Qaboos. This coup enjoyed the support of the shah of Iran and the other Gulf rulers, most 
notably the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Zayed Al Nahyan, worried by potential revolutionary contagion 
from Dhofar to the rest of the Gulf.
13
 It is no surprise that Zayed provided a substantial financial 
help to the new Omani ruler during the Dhofar war, including the provision of a garrison for 
Sohar (Northern Oman) in 1974 to free Qaboos’s troops for fighting the war in the South,
14
 
which officially ended in 1975. 
 
Oman-UAE relations after the 1970s: ‘Twin palm-trees on the same land’? 
 
This war proved decisive for both rulers, as it destroyed the most credible political alternative 
to their national leadership and helped them asserting their political control on the newly 
independent states by defining a new order for which they alone would hold the keys. To this 
end, in both cases, an ambitious policy of national unification was implemented, which has 
become the pivot of the regime’s ideology. This policy has been based on the oil rent, a 
godsend which gave the capacity to implement a widespread redistribution game within the 
framework of an allocation state and which is reserved to nationals only. The public sphere 
became an inexhaustible tank of jobs open to all levels of skill, on territories characterised for 
several decades by emigration. The new civil servants, employed in the national army and 
police, the intelligence service, the ministries and governmental services, were all the less 
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inclined to rise against the regime because they depend on it for their daily lives. Similarly, in 
both Abu Dhabi and Oman, a rewriting of identity frames of reference around the person of the 
ruler, identified in the new historiography with the contemporary welfare state and 
consequently with the country itself, was implemented. This political work on history has aimed 
at ‘naturalising’ the special pantheon—the contemporary regime, the welfare state, and the 
institution and person of the ruler, portrayed as the ‘father of the nation’—which has been the 
basis for both regimes’ legitimacies. However, bilateral relationships between the two rulers 
remained cool for a long period, despite – or, rather, because of – the intimacy of respective 
national-building projects and the two countries’ shared modern history.15 
While Muscat recognised the new UAE state in 1971, it refused to appoint an 
ambassador in Abu Dhabi on the basis that the relations between the two countries were so 
close historically that it was not even necessary to appoint an ambassador. In an interview in 
the 1970s, Sultan Qaboos explained: ‘The brotherly relations between the two peoples are 
flourishing, for this has surpassed the diplomatic and routine and complex procedures. By this I 
mean: we are two brothers, you [the UAE] in your house and we in ours, but the two houses 
are next to each other. Do you really need a mediator? In my opinion, what affects you affects 
me automatically’.16 Even Dhofari revolutionaries from the PFLOAG and Arab nationalist 
opposition forces to the rulers of the UAE and Oman viewed the two ‘as one national entity’ 
and ‘believed in the ‘Natural Oman’ idea, the unification of the Trucial States with Muscat and 
Oman’.
17
 
Mutual relations deteriorated after the 1974 Jeddah agreement between the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia over the demarcation of the UAE-Saudi Arabia border. While Saudi Arabia officially 
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dropped its claim on al-Buraymi oasis,18 Oman considered that the two other countries had 
reached agreement over a part of its territory. Armed clashes happened in December 1977 at 
the border, and many Omanis serving in the UAE army refused to fight against Omani troops.19 
After more than a one year of negotiation, an agreement was signed in April 1979 to fix 10% of 
the total length of the Oman-UAE border. The Sultan of Oman then became aware that too 
much inflexibility would have made economic and social cooperation with the UAE, which was 
vital for Oman, more difficult. 
The rulers of Oman and Abu Dhabi came closer personally during the 1980s; this move 
led to enhanced economic and security relations and to the first exchange of ambassadors in 
1991.
20
 In April 1992 Oman and UAE citizens were granted permission to move across the 
border on an identity card instead of a passport. In May 1992, a joint UAE-Oman commission 
was then entrusted with examining the border issue. In 1993 an official from the Omani 
ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that ‘Oman and the Emirates were twin palm-trees on the 
same land’,
21
 while the Dubai daily al-Khaleej, at the beginning of the negotiations, had the 
headline: ‘One nation, two states’.22 In government newspapers and official statements, the 
relationship between the two countries became increasingly portrayed along terms referring to 
brotherhood. A final agreement on total delimitation was ratified by the rulers in Abu Dhabi on 
22 June 2002. In a July 2002 interview, Sheikh Zayed expressed ‘his deep satisfaction over the 
firm and distinguished fraternal relations between the two countries, which have further 
enhanced affinities of brotherhood, kinship and common history binding the peoples of both 
countries […] He added that the UAE and Oman, by reaching that historic agreement [on the 
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border], have presented an example that could be emulated in sorting out border issues 
between friendly and sisterly countries’.
23
 
For al-Ayn and al-Buraymi, these post-independence decades showed the premises of 
the evolutions to be observed in the 2000s. The trajectories of these two towns, both 
geographically peripheral in their new state and intimately linked to each other, started 
diverging inexorably from the 1970s though. While the rulers in Abu Dhabi and Muscat were 
driven by similar political priorities in the decades following the independence (asserting their 
political power through the construction of a centralised state apparatus and a new national 
identity embodied by the paternalistic figure of the ‘father of the nation’), the parts played by 
al-Ayn and al-Buraymi in these political constructions have been drastically different. Elites 
native of al-Ayn have retained crucial influence in Abu Dhabi, contrary to al-Buraymi’s 
populations within the Omani regime. In addition to it, the highly centralised and authoritarian 
nature of the decision-making in both states has not allowed any latitude of action for 
institutional cross-border cooperation initiatives from local authorities and administrations. 
 
Al-Ayn and al-Buraymi: Contrasting roles in the nation-building project 
 
The oasis of al-Ayn/al-Buraymi, shared nowadays between the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the 
Sultanate of Oman, has been a highly coveted zone since the eighteenth century, due not only 
to its abundant agriculture resources in a very infertile hinterland but also to its strategic 
location at the centre of the Eastern Arabian Peninsula, almost equidistant from Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai (on the Persian Gulf) and Sohar (on the Gulf of Oman). The oasis is described at the 
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beginning of the 20th century as ‘verdant and fruitful. The soil though thin is fertile, and streams 
of running water abound on every side’.
24
 By opposition to its hinterland populated by nomadic 
tribes, the society of the oasis was long composed of sedentary town dwellers (hadar), engaged 
in agriculture activities, and semi-nomad groups who used to settle in the oasis during the 
summer and to live nomadically during the winter, and who became sedentary cultivators in 
the second half of the 20
th
 century. The total population was estimated to amount to 5,500 
inhabitants in 191525 and to 25,000 in 1960. Communications remained extremely difficult until 
the 1960s, as illustrated by the account of British traveller Wilfrid Thesiger in 1948, who 
reached the oasis from Abu Dhabi after a four-day camel ride.26 
 Until the beginning of the 20
th
 century, political control over the main tribal 
confederations living in the oasis oscillated between the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Saudi 
Arabia. At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, then ruler of Abu Dhabi Shakhbut Al Nahyan 
(r.1793-1816) built a fort there, reflecting the old personal connection of the ruling family of 
Abu Dhabi with the oasis. His grandson Zayed bin Khalifa (r.1855-1909) helped the Imam of 
Oman take control of the oasis from the Saudis in 186927 and consolidated his control over 
some of the tribes by buying lands there.
28
 
In 1922 and 1923, the British imposed treaties according to which no oil concession 
would be granted by local rulers except to somebody approved by the British government. 
Several agreements on oil exploration rights in al-Buraymi area were then signed but the 
Second World War put an end to these hopes. Prospecting started again in 1948, but Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC) soon realised that the Sultan of Oman did not have much control 
over the relevant territories, despite his bribing of local tribes. In 1949, King Abd al-Aziz of Saudi 
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Arabia (r.1932-53) awarded a concession to the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) south 
of al-Buraymi; the company started exploration, highlighting a new British-American (IPC versus 
Aramco) tussle over oil-bearing areas. Aware that their area of influence was threatened by this 
oil alliance between United States and Saudi Arabia, the British created a military force in Abu 
Dhabi, the Trucial Oman Scouts. With exacerbation of tension over oil concessions, several 
tribal groups (especially the Bani Qitab, Naim and Bani Kaab) settled in the contested areas 
made use of the struggle for influence between Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Riyadh to hold on to 
their autonomy. The Saudis occupied al-Buraymi in August 1952 and appointed a governor who 
managed to secure the allegiance of many tribal leaders of the oasis.29 A temporary agreement 
was signed between the Saudis and the British in October 1952, to appeal to outside 
arbitration. However in October 1955 the British, ‘fully convinced that they were going to lose 
the case’,
30
 stopped the discussions unilaterally; the Trucial Oman Scouts recaptured al-Buraymi 
oasis at the end of the month. In 1959 and 1960, the Sultan of Oman and the ruler of Abu Dhabi 
signed agreements under the auspices of the British to delineate areas under respective 
authority. This clarification over territories of sovereignty was mainly intended to facilitate the 
awarding of concessions to British companies in area where boundaries had made no sense 
until then. 
Future UAE President Zayed Al Nahyan himself was born in the oasis in 1918 and was 
the representative of the ruler of Abu Dhabi in the oasis from 1946 to 1966; this personal 
connection contributes to explain al-Ayn’s special role in the new UAE state after the 
independence. By the mid-1960s already, the villages under Zayed’s authority benefited from a 
hospital and a school staffed with Jordanian teachers – many years before the same facilities 
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would be available in the Omani-controlled part of the oasis and in the town of Abu Dhabi 
itself.
31
 Since 1971 the ruler’s representative in al-Ayn has been Zayed’s cousin’s son Tahnoon 
Al Nahyan. A prominent businessman,32 he has held top decision-making positions at the 
emirate level, including deputy chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council (Abu Dhabi's 
emirate-level cabinet) from 1977 to 2004 and board member of the Supreme Petroleum 
Council, the highest governing body of hydrocarbons activities in the emirate (1988-2004). 
Zayed’s son and current UAE ruler Khalifa bin Zayed (r.2004-), who was his father’s 
representative in al-Ayn (1966-1970), has been maintaining his principal family home in al-
Ayn.33 
This political influence of al-Ayn connections does not stop at the Abu Dhabi ruling 
family. Beyond their own tribe, Zayed and his son Khalifa have heavily relied on tribes native 
from al-Ayn to fill sensitive civil and military positions – as the latter have been considered as 
the most reliable partners to strengthen the Al Nahyan grip on national power. This is the case 
for the Dhawahir tribe (in the army, in the Interior and in ruling family members’ personal 
offices)34 and for the Bani Qitab (in the army and the police).35 Moreover Gervais explains that 
‘the lack of trust of some tribes vis-à-vis the ruler of Abu Dhabi […] did not result in their 
exclusion from the circles of power. On the contrary, it was offset by the ruler’s effort to 
increase these tribes’ dependence on him, through repeated integration of its members in the 
state apparatus’.
36
 As an illustration of this policy, the Bani Kaab, who long resisted domination 
from both the rulers of the Trucial Coast and the Sultan of Oman, were given key positions by 
Zayed after the independence
37
 in order to ensure their loyalty to the regime. 
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From the independence, the oil rent has been used by Zayed Al Nahyan to develop local 
infrastructure and to exert a growing influence on the borderlands. The national university 
(UAE University), the first in the country, opened in al-Ayn in 1976. By the end of the 1970s a 
four-lane highway was connecting al-Ayn to the capital and in 1994 an international airport 
opened. In 1981, the first dairy farm in the UAE was created in al-Ayn, which has become one of 
the largest in the Middle East. A few years later, the first Coca-Cola bottling plant in the Middle 
East started to operate, and al-Ayn has been home of one of the world’s largest date producers 
(Al Foah). In addition, two private universities (Al-Ayn University of Science and Technology and 
Abu Dhabi University’s local branch) were established in the 2000s. 
Al-Ayn has been trying to develop as a tourism and recreation hub too. As early as 1971 
al-Ayn national museum, the first in the country, was opened. Three major shopping malls were 
established by the end of the 1990s. In 2011, the local cultural sites, constituted by 17 
components, including prehistoric tombs and irrigation systems dating from the Iron Age, were 
registered on UNESCO’s World Heritage List. 
In 2009, an ambitious Plan Al-Ain 203038 identified aviation and defence as key engines 
of the city’s development, in addition to existing agro-business. The Nibras Al Ain Aerospace 
Park was started in 2010 and is intended to be an industrial platform for manufacturing and 
maintenance facilities and training and research institutions. The home of Etihad Airways' pilot 
training centre, it is expected to create 10,000 jobs by 2030. Plan Al-Ain 2030 estimated that 
the city population will reach one million by that year and includes a comprehensive 
redevelopment plan for the central district and the construction of a tram system, the second 
to open in the Gulf after Dubai in 2014. 
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Obviously al-Buraymi has not held the same political role in Oman under Sultan Qaboos 
and the disparity of treatment between al-Ayn and al-Buraymi by their respective national 
authorities was to be seen soon. Until the early 1990s, the Sultanate was divided into two 
governorates (muhafadha) and nine regions (mintaqa), including the ‘Jaw and al-Buraymi’ one 
– which covered the UAE borderland. In 1991 the national territory was re-divided into five new 
regions and three new governorates. These new administrative entities were designed around 
regional capitals destined to become conveyor belts between Muscat and their respective 
hinterlands. The former Jaw and al-Buraymi region was merged into the Dhahira region. Ibri, 
instead of al-Buraymi, became the capital of the new entity. Was this absorption of al-Buraymi 
by the Dhahira region a way to endorse a fait accompli, i.e. the slow economic marginalisation 
of this borderland territory? Or was it a more political decision intended to re-assess al-
Buraymi’s full belonging to the Omani nation, by tying it economically and administratively to 
the interior of Oman? In any case, as a result of this downgrading to just one provincial town in 
northern Oman among others, al-Buraymi remained a semi-rural provincial town well until the 
early 2000s, broadly neglected by the post-1970 centralised modernisation process. Beyond its 
fort and a souk, tourist resources have remained notably underdeveloped in al-Buraymi, as 
bluntly acknowledged by the latest edition of the Lonely Planet guide: ‘It’s fair to stay that 
there’s not much reason to make a special visit  other than if you’re using the UAE border for 
Al-Ain and Abu Dhabi.’
39
 With regard to education, two private higher education institutions 
(Buraymi University College and University of Buraymi) opened their doors (only in 2003 and 
2010 respectively), and have not yet stood the test of time. Until the 2000s, few measures 
addressing specifically borderland regions, and al-Buraymi in particular, had been implemented 
15 
 
to avoid their increasing extraversion towards the UAE. The only noticeable action taken by the 
central government was the prevalence in cabinets of personalities originating from tribes of 
northern Oman.40 They were said to receive preferential treatment aimed at diverting them 
from the enticements of the UAE. 
The contrast between the two cities after three decades of contiguous but separate 
development was summarised by Christopher Davidson: ‘Throughout Zayed's reign as ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, an enormous amount of the emirate's wealth was channelled into Al-Ayn, 
transforming the city into a modern commercial hub, a booming agricultural center, and of 
course into the "garden of the Gulf," with many miles of beautiful parks and landscaped areas. 
In complete contrast, one can walk just a few hundred yards outside of Al-Ayn into the Omani-
controlled and comparatively undeveloped town of Buraimi and perhaps imagine what Al-Ayn 
would have looked like today if it had not received such munificence’.
41
 Then it is no surprise 
that the UAE’s symbolic, cultural and economic influence on northern Oman has only grown 
stronger from the 1970s. The UAE is the first economic partner of Oman, with 27% of its 
importations in value and 70% of its non-oil exports. It has been a geographical sales outlet for 
the Omani exporting companies, a source of supply for petty illicit dealing and private trade, 
and a place where many Omanis of all social conditions, especially from the northern regions, 
go to at weekends, either for fun or for commercial deals. More particularly, the lack of 
employment opportunities in northern Oman (other than in local branches of government and 
public sector administrations) explains why the job market in the UAE has remained attractive 
to many low-skilled Omani individuals. Omani nationals, many of them from border cities and 
regions, have been highly represented in the UAE Armed Forces until the beginning of the 21
st
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century. Joseph Kechichian estimates that more than 30,000 Omanis were already living and 
working in the UAE in the mid-1970s, 85% of whom serving in the military.
42
 This number has 
consistently increased until the early 2000s. Last but not least, for technical reasons (secondary 
school certificate marks too low to gain admission to Sultan Qaboos University), financial 
reasons (inability to pay the tuition fees in private Omani institutions), or personal ones (regular 
returns to Oman), 8,400 Omani students (of which 81% girls) were registered in UAE 
universities in 2011 (a substantial number in lesser ones, like ‘Ajman), which represented 
approximately 56% of all Omani students abroad.
43
 A civil servant native from northern Oman 
highlights the underlying political issues: ‘In [some towns], 80% of the population is dependent 
on the UAE; people are working on construction projects in [the UAE]. Local sheikhs are related 
to Sharjah and Dubai families, by marriage, family agreements or business. [The towns are] 
completely turned towards the UAE.’
44
 
As highlighted by Jean-Luc Piermay in his works on borders in Africa, ‘the main 
characteristic of the border is that it creates differentials: differentials of prices, of revenues, of 
regulations, of supply networks, of modes of organisation, etc.  […] Local actors optimise these 
differentials.’
45
 As such, the border generates new resources, and strategies of adaptation and 
accommodation have been taking place. By the end of the 1990s, al-Buraymi had become a 
dormitory town for al-Ayn. The number of al-Buraymi residents commuting every day to work 
in al-Ayn, and even to Dubai, was estimated at 40,000 by the mid-2000s.
46
 At the national level, 
rents and salaries have been much lower in Oman compared to the UAE, and the situation in 
the two border cities illustrates it, but at a more extreme level. House rents have been three to 
five times lower (and salaries two to three times lower) in al-Buraymi compared to al-Ayn.
47
 As 
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a result of this differentials, a lot of expatriates, in addition to all cross-border Omani workers, 
were living in al-Buraymi but working in al-Ayn – either with a UAE working visa or with an 
Oman residence visa. More generally, al-Buraymi foreign residents have been used to cross the 
border for work, education
48
 and have fun in al-Ayn parks, malls and cinemas. On the other way 
round, al-Ayn inhabitants have gone to al-Buraymi to buy cheaper everyday goods, such as 
furniture and petrol, due to significantly lower prices in Oman compared to the UAE. 
Similarly, the difference of regulations in the hiring of foreign domestic workers and in 
the issuance of working visas (both processes are allegedly much quicker in the UAE than in 
Oman) explains that recruitment agencies in al-Ayn and al-Buraymi have been specialising in a 
human trafficking economy, by bringing housemaids across the border from the UAE into 
Oman, instead of hiring them directly from the home country (Philippines, Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia).
49
 
The contrast of trajectories between the two contiguous cities has been best illustrated 
in their demographic evolution (see table 1). While the total population of the oasis was 
estimated to approach 25,000 in 1960, most probably equally distributed across the border, it is 
fair to assume that by 1970 the population of the UAE side had already surpassed its Omani 
counterpart. By 1993, when the first census was conducted in Oman, al-Ayn’s urban population 
had quadrupled compared to 1975 and was four times higher than al-Buraymi’s. The gap only 
increased during the following two decades, as al-Buraymi’s population doubled between 1993 
and 2016 while al-Ayn’s population expanded by more than two times and a half. Al-Ayn is now 
five times bigger than its Omani counterpart.  
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For long, this extraversion of its borderlands towards the UAE was probably not an issue 
for the Omani government, who considered that the massive number of Omanis employed and 
earning a living in the UAE helped alleviate the financial burden of developing peripheral 
regions of the sultanate. The beginning of the 2000s marked a dramatic turn in the UAE-Oman 
relations, which, as a logical consequence, directly impacted the relationship between the two 
contiguous cities of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi. 
 
The UAE and Oman turning their back to each other from the 2000s 
 
It is at the time when the two countries reached an agreement on the delineation of the border 
and that observers were considering that ‘both sides concluded that their destinies were 
inevitably and permanently tied, for better or worse’
50
 that the question of the symbolic and 
physical separation from the (br)other came back to the fore. In January 2002, the UAE 
announced that work was underway to install a fence along the UAE-Oman border.
51
 In spring 
2003, Oman introduced an exit toll on crossing the United Arab Emirates border (2 Omani Rials 
[OR] per light vehicle going abroad).
52
 By 2004, a 12-foot high border fence with barbed wire 
was dividing al-Ayn/al-Buraymi oasis and border control on all vehicles and pedestrians were 
severely tightened by the UAE authorities. On the Omani side, al-Buraymi was transformed into 
a no man’s land as no checkpoint has been present immediately over the border; checkpoints 
have been set 40 km inland, on roads from al-Buraymi to Muscat and Ibri in June 2004. Non-
GCC residents of al-Buraymi were restricted to this 40-kilometre radius.
53
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Abu Dhabi’s decision to erect a fence to materialise the separation with Oman, more 
than three decades after independence, was officially justified by UAE criticism towards Oman’s 
policy on migration control. The UAE considered that Oman was not doing enough to fight 
illegal immigrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan passing through the Gulf of Oman and the 
Sultanate to find jobs in the UAE. As a matter of fact, a three-day coordinated crackdown was 
launched by the UAE and Omani authorities in July 2004 in al-Buraymi and in nearby villages, 
resulting in the arrest of 1,000 of illegal immigrants.54 However the militarisation of the border 
and the cooling of relations resonate with more structural political and economic challenges 
faced by these two young regimes. 
 
 New challenges impacting the relation with the brother 
 
By the beginning of the 21st century, both countries were started facing a series of domestic 
challenges calling into question the socio-political order established in the 1970s. In Oman, the 
regime’s état de grâce was coming to an end. Given Oman’s limited hydrocarbon resources 
compared to its neighbours, a long-term economic program called ‘Oman 2020: Vision for 
Oman’s Economy’ was established in 1995 that promoted economic diversification and 
nationalisation policy for private sector jobs. However these policies had limited results, as 
illustrated by growing inequalities, endemic unemployment, and poverty, especially outside the 
capital. This sensitive social climate was already causing a revival of frustration and mutual 
prejudice, leading to a re-polarisation of society. This was taking place both in the socio-
economic field, through clientelism and favouritism, and on a more symbolic form through 
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competitive bidding in declarations of Omanity along ethno-linguistic and tribal lines. These 
dynamics were a sign that growing sectors of society, in particular among the young 
generations, were already reluctant to guarantee the perpetuation of a system in which they 
were feeling excluded from political and economic decisions. 
The UAE was not facing similar immediate economic challenges. However with Abu 
Dhabi being by far the largest contributor to the UAE federal budget, and its share of oil 
reserves representing 95% of the UAE’s total, the questions surrounding the approaching end 
of the reign of Zayed Al Nahyan were becoming crucial. As explained by Christopher Davidson, 
the UAE regime’s model of legitimacy was intimately linked to the person of the ‘father of the 
nation’ Zayed Al Nahyan, the figure embodying the UAE welfare state and the redistribution of 
money and wealth to the citizens and among the different emirates, and to him only: ‘Few 
would doubt that Shaikh Khalifa […] could ever hope to draw upon the same level of personal 
legitimacy from his subjects as his distinguished father.’55 
Among the other questions that the authorities were concerned with was the 
nationals/expatriates imbalance, and the alleged impact of demographics on the Emirati 
identity, culture and national security. On the occasion of a conference on national identity in 
April 2008 Dubai’s Police Commander in Chief warned that the Emiratis being a minority in their 
own country could lead to the collapse of the regime: ‘We are building towers but losing the 
Emirates’.
56
 Thus, for Abu Dhabi, the questions of the succession of Zayed bin Sultan, the 
political and economic pre-eminence of Abu Dhabi on the federation and the UAE national 
identity were all interrelated – especially when dealing with the relation to the Omani 
neighbour and brother. 
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2003 and 2004 were also marked by the political ascension of third son of Zayed, 
Mohammed. His appointment as Deputy Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi was followed by his 
nomination as the Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces in January 2005, 
after the death of his father. Mohammed bin Zayed quickly started implementing a policy to 
replace Omanis serving in the federal security forces, out of the perception that such a 
presence could have adverse effects in case of UAE-Oman political tensions. The impact of this 
change of policy was felt immediately in Oman, as many low-skilled and unskilled Omanis who 
had been living in the UAE and sending remittances to their relatives who had stayed at home, 
returned to the country to compete for jobs with home Omani job-seekers on an already 
saturated job market. 
 
Physical demarcation with the (br)other 
 
In February 2005, Sultan Qaboos’ first annual tour across the country since the death of Shaykh 
Zayed took place in the provinces bordering the UAE. This tour was the setting for long-awaited 
development projects, in the matters of housing, road infrastructures and social services. It 
marked a drastic change in the policy of the Omani government towards the border regions. 
Due to the growing economic extraversion of Northern Oman towards UAE development, the 
Sultan was worried about losing the allegiance of these regions breaking away in favour of 
Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and nowadays looking over the border with envy. Oman’s 2006 
budget and the Seventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) illustrated this re-evaluation of the border 
region: this area was to be ‘accorded special attention by the Sultan,’ as explained by Minister 
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of National Economy Ahmed Makki.57 In addition to OR108 million (US$281 million) specifically 
allocated in the annual budget, an additional OR50 million (US$130 million) was put aside in the 
Five-Year Plan for public investment plans (transport infrastructure, schools, etc.) as well as tax 
concessions to the private sector to encourage industrial and tourism projects in these 
provinces. 
In September 2006, in a new sudden unexpected change, non-GCC nationals holding 
Omani residence visas, suspected of working and/or living in the UAE, were no longer allowed 
to enter the UAE unless they purchase a 100 UAE Dirham (AED) entry visa. This measure, which 
had initially been implemented in some border checkpoints outside the cities, did not affect 
expatriates with a UAE residency living in al-Buraymi, who could move freely.
58
 In addition to it, 
it was decided that GCC nationals only could pass through the city centre’s border point (al-
Madeef) while non-GCC nationals (even holding a UAE residence) were required to use another 
border point north of the cities (al-Hili). Again, the Omani authorities considered that these 
decisions were taken without prior notice and affecting badly business and economic situation 
in al-Buraymi. In retaliation, the Sultan of Oman issued a royal decree in October 2006 
dissociating al-Buraymi from Dhahira province and establishing a new al-Buraymi governorate 
comprising three border provinces, and several ministers were urged to rush to al-Buraymi to 
announce new infrastructure investments.
59
 It is no surprise that these short-term belated 
decisions were received with scepticism in al-Buraymi. Its residents perceived them as coming 
too late to offset the effects of the Kafkaesque situation in which their city finds itself, since, 
due to the presence of the checkpoints 40 km inland since 2004, an expatriate holding an 
Omani tourist visa cannot enter al-Buraymi without having his visa cancelled.
60
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In summer 2008, the border point reserved to non-GCC nationals (al-Hili) was 
temporarily closed, requiring them to pass through a new one, some 20 km away south of the 
cities (Khatam al-Shakla). As nicely described by a local businessman, overnight al-Buraymi 
shops were ‘no longer local’
61
 for al-Ayn residents, who represented the vast majority of 
customers of many shops in al-Buraymi but who suddenly had to drive 40km to do some daily 
shopping. Moreover a new UAE visa rule was implemented. Until July 2008 people whose UAE 
visit visa had expired were able to take short trips to neighbouring countries such as Oman and 
Qatar to renew it. Under the new rules, the practice became no longer permissible for all but 33 
exempt nationalities. Visitors from other countries were required to return to their home 
countries for at least a month before being issued another visa. Then thousands of people were 
stuck outside the country (many of them in al-Buraymi) after attempting visa runs, caught 
unawares by the new law.
62
 As a result of these various policies implemented by the UAE, the 
number of expatriates based in al-Buraymi dropped significantly during the second half of the 
2000s (see table 1). 
 
The Arab Spring: Security first 
 
Tensions peaked at the end of 2010 when Omani security officials claimed that 
authorities had uncovered a spy ring ‘affiliated to the state security service of the UAE targeting 
the regime in Oman’, leading to the arrest of 20 Omani officials.
63
 The UAE denied the 
allegations but the crisis was considered serious enough by the other Gulf monarchies that 
mediation was conducted by the Emir of Kuwait in March 2011 to try and solve the dispute. 
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This revelation came a few weeks before the Sultanate experienced its most widespread 
popular protests since the end of the Dhofar war, as part of the Arab uprisings. Major popular 
mobilisations took place in the northern town of Sohar, where two protesters died in February 
and April 2011.
64
 Demonstrations and rallies leading to clashes with the security forces were 
held in al-Buraymi too. Following the clearing of the peaceful gatherings by riot police, a 
creeping militarisation of the territory took place, as shown by the transformation of Sohar and 
al-Buraymi into fortified cities in April and May 2011, with the deployment of the army in town, 
and the drastic increase of police controls and check-points on roads to the UAE since then. 
During all this troubled period, and more generally since the independence, there has 
been a complete absence of contacts and relations at local level for solving problems, let alone 
any attempt at establishing local channels of institutional cooperation. This has to do with the 
authoritarian and hyper-centralised nature of decision-making processes in both Muscat and 
Abu Dhabi, where all initiatives come from the central government. Far from pushing for some 
decentralisation, the creation of a governorate in al-Buraymi in 2006, where the governor is 
appointed by sultan’s decree and acts under the strict supervision of the Minister of Interior, 
was clearly intended to re-assert central control on the border region. On the occasion of his 
visit to al-Buraymi in May 2008, the US Ambassador to Oman had the opportunity to 
experience the governor’s total absence of latitude of action: ‘Of interest is what was not 
discussed during the Ambassador's initial meeting with […] the governor of Buraimi. In 
submitting the request for the appointment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to schedule 
it on the condition that the Ambassador not raise any substantive issues with the governor. The 
meeting itself was devoid of genuine substance, an indication that the sheikh was following  
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strict [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] orders to keep discussion to the weather and the immaculate 
condition of Buraimi's streets.’
65
 In October 2011, a sultan’s decree announced the 
establishment of municipal councils in all governorates. However, this attempt to show 
Qaboos’s attentiveness to the population’s aspirations for greater participation in decision-
making had only very limited impact. Composed of members elected by universal suffrage for 
four-year renewable terms, as well as ex-officio members representing ministries, the 
municipal councils are chaired by the sultan-appointed governor. They have only advisory 
powers, and provide opinions and recommendations only on the development of municipal 
services in the governorate (infrastructure, health, local taxes, and so on). On the UAE side of 
the border, the ruler’s representative in al-Ayn belongs to Al Nahyan’s ruling family and Abu 
Dhabi inner circles of power, which explains that no intention of cross-border cooperation has 
ever been present among local authorities. 
In October 2013, in a rare coordination move, the two countries decided to go a step 
further in making border-crossing more difficult by introducing a new border-crossing tax for 
expatriates. All non-GCC nationals would pay AED35 to enter the UAE and, if they have no 
residence visa in Oman, OR5 to enter al-Buraymi from Oman (there is no fee to leave the UAE 
and to enter Oman). This applies to expatriates with the UAE residency permits living in al-
Buraymi and working in al-Ayn and to expatriate students living in al-Buraymi and attending 
school in al-Ayn due to the lack of educational offer on the Omani side, who benefited until 
then from entry passes issued by Abu Dhabi authorities allowing unlimited crossing.
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 In 
October 2015 the UAE tightened the rules further by requiring all citizens from countries like 
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India, Pakistan and Philippines – regardless of their professional status and even if they have a 
residence visa for Oman – to apply for a visa to be able to travel to the UAE.
67
 
These new regulations were obviously motivated by increasing security concerns in both 
capitals. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Muscat and Abu Dhabi presume that the other is a 
cause of political destabilisation – as a porous border is supposed to result in more smuggling 
and entry of illegal migrants on one side (from the UAE point of view) and in the proliferation of 
Islamist activism and/or spying networks (according to Oman). Since 2011, senior Omani 
officials and the national media have repeatedly accused protesters of being under foreign 
influence, in order to discredit them and their demands. An illustration of this was the 
sentencing of a Salafi Parliament member from Liwa (North Batina governorate) in 2014 to 
three years in jail on charges of illegal gathering and undermining the status and prestige of the 
state. Concomitantly, four of his supporters (businessmen and civil servants) from al-Buraymi 
were arrested and held for several months.68 Omani intelligence and internal security made 
unambiguous references to the support that these Salafi networks in Oman could have 
benefited from UAE individuals. In addition to these security concerns, these sealing measures 
intend to increase competition between the two cities, by forcing them to turn their back to 
each other and to develop independently (and at the expense of) the other. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Since the 1970s, border cities of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi have been following divergent, and by 
many aspects, opposed trajectories – emulating the way how the United Arab Emirates and 
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Oman have grown separately. Despite the shared history and the undisputable ‘feeling of 
belonging together’
69
 that has presided for long over the relations among inhabitants of the 
two cities, the imperative for both regimes to turn their back to each other, for legitimacy and 
security purposes, have translated in al-Ayn/al-Buraymi in a complete absence of local cross-
border co-operation and in growing asymmetries – in size, in economic wealth and 
attractiveness and in political influence on the national arena. The erection of the fence across 
the conurbation in the 2000s and the materialisation of the separation from the br(other) that 
went with it have played a key role in increasing this – local and national – gap. Even more than 
allowing the UAE (and al-Ayn) to project its power over Oman (and al-Buraymi), the physical 
demarcation from the neighbour, and the extent of devices and measures mobilised for it, has 
to be understood as part of the strategies of legitimation used by the ruling family of Abu Dhabi 
for the last decade. For a small state like the UAE that has branded itself as the epitomy of a 
globalised country, the fenced wall with Oman has played a critical role in justifying its 
existence as a nation – after the demise of the ‘father of the nation’ sheikh Zayed – and as a 
federal state – distinct from its Omani brother. This question has been crucial for the Omani 
regime too, considering the structural economic challenges faced by the Sultanate since the 
beginning of the 21st century, the increasing dependency of many provinces of northern Oman 
towards the UAE and the political consequences that ensue, of which the protests taking place 
during the Arab Spring have been one illustration among others. No wonder therefore that 
these issues have crystallised in the peripheral border cities of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi, where 
the questions of political allegiance and belonging to the national community have been critical 
since the mid-20
th
 century. 
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